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Abstract 
  The BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill highlighted the glaring weakness in the current 
liability and regulatory regime for oil spills and for environmental catastrophes more broadly. 
This article proposes a new liability structure for deep sea oil drilling and for catastrophic risks 
generally. It delineates a two-tier system of liability. The first tier would impose strict liability up 
to the firm’s financial resources plus insurance coverage. The second tier would be an annual tax 
equal to the expected costs in the coming year beyond this damages amount. A single firm will 
be identified as responsible for generating the risk. It would be required to demonstrate 
substantial ability to pay in the first tier before being permitted to engage in the risky activity. 
This structure provides for efficient deterrence for environmental catastrophes, since the 
responsible party is bearing in expectation the risks it is imposing. It also addresses the 
challenges posed by the fat-tailed distributions of catastrophic environmental risks and provides 
for more assured and adequate compensation of potential losses than current liability and 
regulatory arrangements.  
 1 
The Challenge of Catastrophic Environmental Risks 
On April 20, 2010, an explosion on the BP Deepwater Horizon rig set off the nation’s 
largest coastal oil spill.
1 This disaster killed 11 workers and ultimately dumped an estimated 4.9 
million barrels of oil into the Gulf of Mexico.
2 President Obama declared this event to be the 
worst environmental disaster in U.S. history.
3 It imposed financial costs in the tens of billions of 
dollars.
4
Matters could have been much worse, both financially and environmentally. Had the spill 
had been generated by a medium-sized or even large firm, rather than giant BP, the 
consequences would have been far graver. Resource damages would have been left unabated, 
and financial losses would have been at best fractionally compensated. BP’s unusually deep 
pockets made appropriate compensation feasible.  
   
The environmental damage turned out to be less than many scenarios suggested. Indeed, 
the best-estimate projections of environmental harm were well above the damage that was 
actually inflicted.
5
                                                           
1 NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE DRILLING, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, 
DEEPWATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE DRILLING vi (2011) [hereinafter BP COMM’N 
REPORT], available at 
http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/default/files/documents/DEEPWATER_ReporttothePresident_FINAL.pdf.  
 Far greater ecological harms threatened, including severe long-term damage 
to prime beach areas along the Gulf Coast. Among the factors that reduced costs below 
expectations were the under anticipated capabilities of oil eating microbes that broke down much 
of the crude oil, and the Gulf currents that conveyed the oil away from the areas where it would 
2 Id. at 55, 167. 
3 Id. at 173 (“Already, this oil spill is the worst environmental disaster America has ever faced.”). 
4See id. at vi (“The costs from this one industrial accident are not yet fully counted, but it is already clear that . . . 
economic losses total tens of billions of dollars.”).  
5 Id. at 174 (“However widespread (and in many cases severe) the natural resource damages are, those observed so 
far have fallen short of some of the worst expectations and reported conjectures during the early stages of the 
spill.”). 2 
have caused great damage.
6
The BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill exposed glaring institutional failures in safety. All 
the three major companies involved in the spill had safety shortcomings, which together created 
the conditions for the massive spill that resulted.
 Even though the BP spill was the greatest environmental disaster the 
nation has seen to date, there is the potential under the current liability and regulatory regime for 
human action to cause more devastating catastrophes. And these catastrophes would be 
compounded if the responsible firms have far fewer financial resources than BP, as virtually all 
do.  
7
The inadequate performance of our governmental institutions for controlling drilling risks 
has received considerable notice. In May 2010, through Executive Order 13,543, President 
Obama established the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and 
 The spill also highlighted the deficiencies of 
the current regulatory and liability structures for addressing catastrophic risks. Deepwater 
drilling provides a timely case study of how to structure liability for an economic activity that 
poses a potential catastrophic loss. Damages that potentially far exceed the injurer’s financial 
resources diminish the ability of the tort liability system to create incentives for safety and to 
provide compensation. The current liability and regulatory regime for deepwater drilling should 
hardly be thought of as a system. Rather, it consists of a hodge podge of liability structures, 
damages limits, and ineffective regulatory efforts. We propose that this regime be jettisoned and 
replaced by a sounder structure, whose predominant risk-control mechanism is an effective 
liability system.  
                                                           
6 Id.  
7 Id. at 90 (“Better management by BP, Halliburton, and Transocean would almost certainly have prevented the 
blowout by improving the ability of individuals involved to identify the risks they faced, and to properly evaluate, 
communicate, and address them.”). 3 
Offshore Drilling (“Commission”) to address the spill.
8 Through the rest of 2010, the 
Commission issued reports criticizing the Obama Administration’s handling of the spill.
9 In 
January 2011, the Commission’s final report detailed a series of proposed reforms, including 
revamping the agencies that regulate deepwater drilling.
10
  As this is written, Japan is experiencing an environmental disaster of far graver 
consequence from another energy-related industry: the explosions, partial meltdowns, and 
radioactive releases at four of its nuclear plants. These events were triggered by a massive 
earthquake. To be sure, nature played a far more consequential role in that disaster than it did 
with the BP spill. It would be inappropriate to diagnose America’s greatest environmental 
disaster but pay no attention to one far greater that occurred within the same twelve months in 
another highly developed nation. The analysis of that disaster, however, including the allocation 
of responsibility, will have to await another day.
  
11
This analysis seeks neither to lay blame for the past, nor to describe specific actions that 
would appropriately limit losses in the future. Rather, it defines a regulatory and liability 
 But the principles discussed here should 
surely be examined in light of the Japanese experience, with similarities and differences 
identified, and their implications for desirable regulatory and liability structures explored. We 
draw one central lesson from these two disasters and many others studied: It is extremely 
difficult to predict the nature of or magnitude of catastrophic events. And the losses entailed, 
even within a class of disasters such as hurricanes or earthquakes, have fat-tailed distributions, 
implying potentially huge outlier events, as we shall discuss further below.  
                                                           
8 Exec. Order No. 13,543, 75 Fed. Reg. 29,397 (May 21, 2010). 
9 See, e.g., John M. Broder, Report Slams Administration for Underestimating Gulf Spill, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2010, 
at A20, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/07/science/earth/07spill.html.  
10 BP COMM’N REPORT, supra note 1, at 250-91. 
11 At the present time, it appears that the Tokyo Electric Power Co. (Tepco) may not be able to cover the tens of 
billions of dollars of losses. The Tepco Chairman Tsunehisa Katsumata made the following observation: “No matter 
how much money we have, it will not be enough.” Yuka Hayashi, Japan Confronts Liabilities for Crisis, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 4, 2011, at A13. 4 
framework that will encourage the parties involved in offshore drilling, or indeed any economic 
activity potentially producing catastrophic environmental consequences, to take appropriate 
actions. Our underlying assumption is that decisions relating to such activities are highly 
complex and constantly evolving and that the only way to get to desirable outcomes is to have 
parties face appropriate incentives. In a technologically advanced and advancing society, 
regulation alone will not be sufficient, since it will likely be directed to yesterday’s problems. 
Moreover, liability schemes that might function well for traditional environmental externalities 
are not well equipped to deal with extreme potential outcomes. Indeed, given that few 
corporations have sufficient resources to cover the most extreme outcomes, the efficient control 
regime must incorporate not merely regulation and liability, but also include some tax charges 
for any extreme risks imposed on external parties that will not be addressed should the 
company’s financial resources be exhausted. This article develops a ten-point proposal for 
overhauling the current liability and regulatory regime for deep-water drilling. The principles we 
advocate apply to many other contexts in which private entities are undertaking actions that 
could create potentially catastrophic environmental risks.  
The generic problem we address is the following. Firms potentially could generate 
hazards that inflict damages that exceed their financial resources. Should the government deal 
with low probability-high loss situations by imposing a modest damages limit so that few firms 
will be daunted by the prospect of paying losses? Or should there be no limit to liability 
exposure? Either of these extremes would work poorly. The first would lead firm to take 
excessive risks. The second would impose losses exceeding many firms’ financial resources. 
Thus, firms with few financial resources to lose would enter and engage in excessively risky 
behavior.  5 
Our proposal jettisons the current structure of a low damages cap coupled with 
ineffective regulation.
12
Our proposal starts by recognizing that the potential for catastrophic accidents generally, 
and the BP accident specifically, represents the challenge of effectively controlling risks that 
impose damages on others in their most extreme form. Controlling risks is always difficult 
because of the problems of asymmetric information, the need for regulation and litigation to be 
effectively aligned, the dual needs of deterrence and efficient compensation, a range of 
additional analytic issues, and, of course, politics. This analysis addresses the cluster of 
considerations that must enter any risk-control regime, and pays particular attention to extreme 
risks. It leaves politics aside because we think that a well structured regime, when chosen far in 
advance of the next accident, has a reasonable chance to win political approval. By contrast, once 
an accident happens, strong interests become established and reasoned discourse and clear 
thinking in the political arena are challenged. Since accidents are low probability events, it is 
difficult to identify either victims or responsible parties in advance. 
 It replaces it with a greatly expanded level of liability coupled with a tax 
to provide incentives for risks beyond the liability limit, which we call a two-tier liability system. 
This system creates strong financial incentives for safety. If welcomed by the risk-control 
community, this structure can provide the framework not only for addressing deepwater drilling 
risks but for other catastrophic risks. That is, with modest modifications it could be employed to 
address a broad range of catastrophic environmental risks.  
The BP spill, the event that inspires this volume, is an outlier among environmental 
accidents for three reasons. First, its mere magnitude as the largest coastal spill in U.S. history, 
both in terms of quantity of oil and numbers of people affected, makes it stand out. Second, 
                                                           
12 The Oil Pollution Act (“OPA”) has a nominal damages cap of $75 million for firms that are not grossly negligent 
or otherwise reckless. See 33 U.S.C. § 2704(a)(3). Given the BP experience, however, firms in the future might not 
expect that this cap will be binding for major oil spills. See discussion infra. 6 
multiple parties—three important ones—helped contribute to the situation producing the 
catastrophe. That is often the case, but many models of risk deterrence assume there is one 
responsible party, or at least one predominant responsible party. Third, the magnitude of the 
damages assessed would be sufficient to bankrupt almost all companies, though fortunately that 
was not true in the case of BP, which independent of culpability will be paying all or virtually all 
of the damages.  
Our proposal incorporates two basic principles. First, the overall goal of a risk-control 
structure should be to minimize the sum of two costs: the costs of losses plus the costs of 
avoiding losses. Second, no structure for controlling catastrophic losses can effectively meet the 
cluster of goals that all would agree are desirable for such a scheme.  
  For concreteness, our analysis refers to the “oil company” as the company owning the 
lease and operating the well. We realize that there may be other institutional arrangements.  
The components of our reform proposal are as follows: 
1.  Identifiable responsible party. The oil company that owns the lease and undertakes 
the drilling is fully responsible for all financial harms directly associated with the spill. This 
ensures that there is one party overseeing the whole process, a party that coordinates and 
monitors the actions of those beneath it. There is no separate liability for other firms involved in 
the drilling.
13
                                                           
13 The Japanese nuclear disaster liability system provides an interesting contrast with U.S. liability systems. In the 
Japanese system, the plant operator bears almost all liability. See Nuclear Damage Compensation Law, Law No. 
No.147 of 1961, art. 3. Thus, for example, General Electric, which manufactured the Mark I reactor which has 
encountered a range of safety issues, will not bear significant financial responsibility. See GE Unlikely to Face 
Liability in Japanese Nuclear Crisis, BUS. INS., Apr. 1, 2011, 
http://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20110401/NEWS01/110409998.  
 Thus, for example, there is no joint and several liability as under the current 
system. The oil company can establish whatever contractual arrangements it wishes with other 
firms involved in the drilling operations, and the oil company in turn can recoup costs due to 7 
negligence or other specified behavior of its corporate partners based on whatever contractual 
arrangements it makes with them. 
2.  Strict Liability
3. 
. The responsible party is strictly liable for all losses due to the spill. 
There is consequently no need to ascertain the appropriate level of care and whether the drilling 
operations met that level of care. Nor is there the need to evaluate the behavior of other partners 
in the drilling effort. The only informational requirement for implementing our liability proposal 
is to determine the amount of damages. 
Tax on noncompensable risk imposed
4. 
. No corporation has sufficient resources to 
cover the most extreme potential losses from an accident. In case of a mega-catastrophe, either 
the government will pay significant amounts and/or losses will go uncompensated. The result is 
that the operator will essentially be judgment proof for extreme accidents. Absent other 
arrangements, excess risks will therefore be undertaken. To correct this propensity, the operator 
should pay a tax for the expected external losses imposed beyond the amount that it will be able 
to pay. Having this arrangement in place will allow operators to drill even if they do not have the 
resources to cover losses in excess of the BP Deepwater Horizon spill. This tax establishes what 
we term a tiered liability system when imposed in conjunction with liability for damages up to 
the cap specified in the demonstration of financial capacity.  
Demonstration of financial capacity. Restrict deepwater oil drilling to firms that can 
demonstrate either adequate financial resources or insurance to cover the cost of catastrophic 
spills of the magnitude of the BP Deepwater Horizon spill. The responsible party will be strictly 
liable for all damages up to its financial capacity. 8 
5. Damages. There are three components to our damages proposal. A. Completely 
eliminate any cap on damages. (The cap is currently set at a paltry $75 million.
14
6. 
) B. Eliminate 
all punitive damages for oil spills. C. Only direct losses are compensable. The elimination of the 
damages cap couple with our tiered liability system will establish efficient incentives for safety. 
Because catastrophic oil spills can be readily monitored, additional punitive damages are not 
needed to establish the efficient level of care. Payments for financial and property damage losses 
are limited to losses directly caused by the spill. More distant economic ramifications of these 
losses are not compensable. 
Natural resources damages and restoration
7. 
. For natural resource damages, the primary 
emphasis should be on restoration. Restoration should continue until the natural resource benefits 
of additional restoration no longer exceed their costs.  
Recipient of net resource value losses
8. 
. For any shortfall of the restoration from 
complete restoration, the oil company must pay the government for the natural resource damages 
that are incurred. Such damages would also include losses for the period before a resource is 
restored. The government may choose to use these funds for further restoration at the site, for 
restoration elsewhere, for other environmental efforts, or for other purposes. 
Regulatory complement
9. 
. Liability should be coupled with a regulatory regime where 
the regulation of drilling activities was based on a comparison of the benefits and costs of these 
efforts, with the goal to maximize benefits less costs. Full adherence to regulatory standards 
would not protect a firm against damages from accidents.  
Focused, net economic benefits
                                                           
14 See 33 U.S.C. § 2704(a)(3). 
. In assessing the benefits of deepwater oil drilling, 
there should be no additional premium accorded to the economic benefits associated with 
national security or employment effects beyond the assessed benefits for other less risky drilling 9 
activities, or other sources of energy. Any crediting of oil exploration of any kind with broader 
economic benefits to the economy must be done on a net benefit basis that also incorporates 
recognition of the environmental harms associated with the production and consumption of 
petroleum products, including the effect on global climate change. 
10. Moratorium on all new deepwater drilling
Although these proposals have been tailored to the oil drilling situation, they can be 
readily adapted to other contexts. Spills from oil tankers, such as the Exxon Valdez oil spill, 
represent an obvious extension. The hazards of nuclear reactors represent an analogous situation 
of a low probability-catastrophic loss activity. Clearly, we would not extend our proposal to 
require that all economic activity have the tiered liability structure. But we would extend our 
proposal to situations in which there is the prospect of catastrophic losses sufficiently prominent 
that legislative damages caps have been enacted. Oil drilling, oil transport, and nuclear power are 
among the most prominent economic activities that meet this test.  
. Until these proposals (with modifications 
to be expected) are adopted, there should be a moratorium on all new deepwater drilling 
activities. Exemptions from the moratorium should be granted to a firm accepting strict liability, 
demonstrating adequate financial resources to pay for the costs of a major disaster, paying the tax 
for the expected damages beyond its financial capacity, and subjecting its proposed drilling 
operations to a safety review. 
 
Efficient Safety Levels  
Before considering the performance of and possible changes in the role of liability and 
regulation with respect to potentially catastrophic environmental risks, it is useful to specify the 
objectives we seek to promote and the criteria by which we will be judging policies. Our 10 
approach assumes that the proper role of liability and regulation is to produce efficient risk 
outcomes in terms of establishing an appropriate balance between the benefits and costs of 
promoting safety.  
Our working assumption is that the level of safety should be set at an economically 
efficient level. This assumption has two principal consequences for the design of social policies 
to address environmental risks.
15
 While implementing these guidelines for catastrophic environmental risks poses 
considerable challenges to be examined below, formulating the policy objective in this manner 
clarifies many fundamental policy issues. At the most basic level, the optimal level of safety will 
seldom involve zero risk. Deepwater oil exploration is an inherently risky enterprise that in the 
case of the BP Deepwater well involved drilling in more than 5,000 feet of Gulf water followed 
by drilling more than 13,000 feet below the sea floor.
 First, policies should be structured to maximize the net benefits 
to society, which is equivalent to maximizing the difference between the benefits and costs. 
Second, the implication of this objective is that the level of safety should be increased until the 
incremental benefits from boosting the level of safety just equal the incremental costs. In the 
usual situation, the cost of providing safety rises at an increasing rate as the level of safety is 
increased, while the benefits of providing higher levels of safety diminish as the safety level 
rises. 
16
                                                           
15 For a review of these principles, see W. KIP VISCUSI, JOHN M. VERNON, & JOSEPH E. HARRINGTON, JR., 
ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 30-33 (4th ed. 2005). 
 The mere magnitudes involved imply 
significant risk, but beyond that all such efforts involve new technologies that by definition have 
not been battle tested, hence involve risks despite the analytic studies, laboratory tests and field 
tests that may have been conducted. Because incremental costs tend to escalate rapidly as the 
level of the risk is reduced toward zero, it will usually be efficient from an economic standpoint 
16 BP COMM’N REPORT, supra note 1, at viii. 11 
for there to be some chance of adverse events, including potentially catastrophic environmental 
disasters.
17
Oil spills impose severe external financial and environmental harms that a profit-
maximizing firm will not take into full account absent liability and/or government sanctions. Left 
unfettered, enterprise decisions will be neither socially desirable nor economically efficient. 
Catastrophic environmental risks add an additional dimension to the traditional externalities 
problem—the potential that even with existing systems of liability a firm may be judgment proof 
for a significant portion of losses, hence too reckless. Our policy proposals are targeted at 
achieving the appropriate balance between safety and safety expenditure even when catastrophic 
losses are possible.  
 Even for risks posing potentially catastrophic losses, it is generally neither feasible 
nor desirable to completely eliminate these hazards. The task for regulatory and liability policies 
is to ensure that the prevailing level of risk is set at the efficient level and that if an adverse event 
does occur that the remediation and compensation is appropriate. The fact that deepwater drilling 
poses potentially serious environmental risks and has already produced a catastrophic loss is not 
a sufficient reason in and of itself for banning the activity. Similarly, the Japanese nuclear plant 
catastrophe does not imply that the world should abandon nuclear power, rather that we should 
have better systems in place to assure appropriate safety with both technologies. 
Formulating the efficiency objective highlights what factors are and are not pertinent for 
setting safety levels. An oft heard argument that has played a prominent role in the deepwater 
drilling debate is that the country needs to continue deepwater drilling and other risky oil 
                                                           
17 If the costs avoided are great, then it is perfectly rational to accept a small but positive risk of even a mega-
catastrophe. By analogy, we often risk our lives and those of family members—which is as bad an outcome as we 
can imagine for ourselves—by driving to a recreational event. No loss carries a weight of minus infinity. See 
Lawrence Summers & Richard Zeckhauser, Policymaking for Posterity, 37 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 115-40 (2008) 
(observing that even the most severe potential loss from climate change—which could entail the end of human 
civilization—should not get an implied infinite weight). 12 
industry activities to meet our national goal of achieving energy independence.
18 Indeed, the 
energy independence mantra was used to justify “Project Independence” under the Nixon 
administration, which led to significant increase in offshore oil exploration, including additional 
leases off the Gulf coast.
19
“Independence” concerns are at best tangentially relevant to regulating the level of safety 
for deepwater drilling for several reasons. First, the price of petroleum products in the United 
States and other countries is driven by the world oil price and the subsequent refinery and 
distribution costs. U.S. production of oil represents a very small share of the world output and is 
not even a dominant share of U.S. consumption.
 Energy independence is an effective battle cry, used by both “drill 
baby drill” proponents and fierce energy conservationists. But is an unattainable goal in the 
foreseeable future, as all parties would admit if they examined the evidence.  
20
                                                           
18 BP COMM’N REPORT, supra note 1, at 56. 
 Except in situations involving cutoffs to the 
U.S. oil supply, such as oil embargoes and crises in major oil producing countries, whether the 
oil is domestic or foreign matters little. The national security benefits are derived from all U.S. 
oil production, not simply risky drilling, such as that associated with deepwater undertakings. An 
appropriate policy mechanism for reflecting concerns with maintaining domestic production for 
security reasons would be to provide tax subsidies for all domestic oil production, where those 
subsidies recognized the overall economic desirability of all U.S. oil production and did not 
place a differential premium on the forms of oil drilling that pose potentially catastrophic 
environmental risks. Our policy proposal 9 is that any credit for favorable national security 
effects should apply to all oil drilling, with no special premium accorded to that in deepwater. 
19 Id. at 31. 
20 See U.S. Energy Information Administration (“EIA”), How Dependent Are We on Foreign Oil?, ENERGY IN 
BRIEF, Nov. 29, 2010, http://www.eia.doe.gov/energy_in_brief/foreign_oil_dependence.cfm (noting that the U.S. 
produced eleven percent of the world’s petroleum and that petroleum imports made up fifty one percent of U.S. 
demand in 2009).  13 
Thus, even allowing for national security concerns, there is no valid reason for relaxing the 
safety standards for offshore drilling. We also note that most major energy-producing 
technologies, for example nuclear power as the Fukushima incident makes evident, also pose the 
risk of catastrophic environmental consequences. All energy producing technologies should be 
treated the same in terms of credit for associated benefits, such as national security, or associated 
harms, such as global warming effects. 
A parallel argument applies for not considering the employment effects of deepwater 
drilling as an economic benefit. All economic activity generates associated employment effects, 
and there is no reason to subsidize either oil production generally or deepwater drilling 
specifically in order to create employment. Secondary economic losses are not counted in our 
proposal. But that is because secondary economic benefits also accrue when compensation is 
paid, or government spends money, as would happen with our proposal after a spill. Appropriate 
levels of safety should not be compromised in order to foster higher levels of employment. 
Nevertheless, a danger of excessively stringent regulations and liability rules is that they will 
discourage industries and activities that are economically efficient. That would have undesirable 
labor market effects. Employment consequences matter, and they should be recognized as a 
potential source of costs of excessively stringent policies, but they do not provide an independent 
basis for justifying situations that put the environment at excess risk. 
Policy principle 9 also specifies that any tally of the broader economic ramifications of 
oil exploration must recognize the net consequences of petroleum products, including their 
negative effects. Chief among these is that petroleum products are associated with environmental 
pollution, importantly including contributing to global climate change. Policies should be based 
on a comprehensive approach to assessing the desirability of oil exploration that considers all 14 
consequences and bases policy on the difference between positive and negative effects. The 
prime negatives—the conventional pollutants associated with petroleum products and their 
climate-change impact—are substantial.
21
Establishing the appropriate balance between the costs of providing safety against the 
sum of the benefits it provides plus the expected environmental benefits of more stringent safety 
standards, though conceptually simple, encounters severe difficulties in practice. The most 
significant is obtaining a meaningful assessment of the expected environmental costs of 
deepwater drilling and an assessment of how these costs will be reduced through more stringent 
control. The expected cost is defined as the product of the probability of an adverse outcome and 
the size of the loss. The calculation for multiple possible events consists of the sum of these 
expected costs for all types of possible adverse outcomes.  
 Only a net tally, which also took account of taxes at 
end use, could tell us whether or not we should subsidize oil exploration, as the nation does at 
present, most importantly with generous depletion allowances.  
There are substantial gaps in our knowledge pertaining to both the probabilities and the 
potential harms associated with major oil spills, the two components of the calculation. Very 
frequently occurring risks that pose moderate or minor harms create little difficulty for assessing 
the likelihoods or magnitudes of losses. These events occur quite often, so that it is 
straightforward to learn about both their likelihoods and magnitudes. Moreover, because the 
events are frequent and the stakes modest, having a period to learn about the actual level of the 
risks and the value of damages is not that costly. Situations in which the probabilities are well 
known are situations of risk. 
                                                           
21 For a discussion of conventional pollutants that are linked to petroleum products, see W. Kip Viscusi, Wesley A. 
Magat, Alan Carlin & Mark K. Dreyfus, Environmentally Responsible Energy Pricing, 15 THE ENERGY J., April 
1994, at 23-42. For linkage to global climate change, see Intergovernmental Penal on Climate Change, IPCC Fourth 
Assessment Report 2007, at 265 (2007).  15 
Matters become quite different once we venture into the low probability-high 
consequence world of catastrophic risks. Because the probabilities are very small, there are few 
opportunities to learn about the magnitude of the risk. Thus, we may be aware of the presence of 
hazards but have only a poor idea of the size of the probabilities that are involved, making this a 
situation of uncertainty – one where probabilities are not known – rather than risk. Probability 
assessments become even more complicated when trying to ascertain the incremental effect of 
safety measures, as there may be even less knowledge of how these small probabilities will 
change as different safety precautions are taken. Similarly, the magnitude of the losses – the 
other component of the loss calculation – may be highly unpredictable even after an oil spill 
occurs. Even a year after the BP Deepwater Horizon spill, there remains substantial disagreement 
about what the ultimate harm will be. 
Indeed, matters may be more difficult: some types of hazards may not be identifiable in 
advance. When the states of the world (as decision theorists call them) are unknown, we are in a 
“world of ignorance” rather than one of mere uncertainty.
22 As one Shell geophysicist 
commented, “you just don’t know what you don’t know.”
23
One approach for dealing with dimly understood or, worse, hard-to-conjecture risks is to 
take advantage of information that may develop over time, as these disasters need not be a 
complete surprise. The BP Deepwater Horizon well had developed unexpected pressure 
anomalies that cast doubt on the integrity of the cement casing for the well, but this information 
was not fully exploited.
  
24
                                                           
22 Richard Zeckhauser introduces this term in the context of the climate debate. See STRATEGY AND CHOICE 
(Richard J. Zeckhauser ed., 1991). 
 Establishing greater corporate responsibility for liability will provide 
incentives for the oil drilling company to develop and utilize such ongoing informational inputs 
23 BP COMM’N REPORT, supra note 1, at 32. 
24 Id. at 98, 105. 16 
in making their safety decisions. The government should take measures to collect and facilitate 
sharing of such information among companies.  
 
Behavioral Decision, Fat Tails, and the Separation of Probability and Size of Loss 
Our discussion, and most analyses, of losses due to catastrophic environmental 
catastrophes assume that we will approach policy decisions using a rational framework. Yet a 
broad strand of research developed over the past three decades demonstrates that individuals 
have great difficulties assessing and evaluating low-probability, high-consequence events. They 
fall prey to errors both systematic and severe. Though the study of institutions, such as 
government agencies and corporations, in dealing with such decisions is less well developed, 
there is little evidence that their decisions come any closer to optimality.
25
To illustrate, consider the availability heuristic.
  
26 It tells us that decision makers judge the 
likelihood of an event by how easily they can bring an instance to mind. Thus in light of the 
recent Japanese nuclear power disaster, it seems clear that both citizens and governments will 
think the probability of a nuclear meltdown is much higher than they would have a few months 
earlier. Yet an earthquake of the magnitude of the Japanese quake is exceedingly unusual; it 
ranks as one of the largest earthquakes ever experienced in recorded history.
27
                                                           
25 W. KIP VISCUSI, RATIONAL RISK POLICY (1998). 
 Indeed, mere 
event similarity may be sufficient to dramatically influence policy decisions. The Three Mile 
Island incident in the United States effectively shut down nuclear power construction for 
decades, even though the esteemed Kemeny Commission estimated that less than one life was 
26 See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability, 5 
COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207-32 (1973). 
27 See, e.g., U.S. Geological Survey, Largest Earthquakes in the World Since 1900, 
http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/world/10_largest_world.php (last visited May 10, 2011) (ranking the 
Japanese quake as the fourth largest earthquake since 1990, behind earthquakes in Chile, the United States, and 
Indonesia). 17 
lost from the radiation released.
28
Prospect Theory is a seminal article in the behavioral decision field.
 But citizens, and hence legislators (and even regulators) 
assumed that a major life-loss incident from a to-be-built nuclear power plant was much more 
likely than it would have been. 
29 It notes that 
individuals make decisions reflecting severe biases relative to prescriptive decision analysis both 
in valuing outcomes and weighing probabilities. In valuing outcomes, it hypothesizes that 
individuals are appropriately risk-averse in achieving gains, but, contrary to rational prescription 
are risk-preferring in the loss domain. Thus, for instance, they would rather take a 50% chance of 
losing $400 than lose $200 for sure. The implications for catastrophic environmental losses are 
profound. For example, we may do too little to control them relative to other risks that have 
lesser expected consequences but greater probabilities of occurrence.
30
Prescriptive decision analysis tells us that probabilities should be weighted linearly; a 
10% chance of a loss is twice as consequential as a 5% chance. Prospect Theory, and empirical 
studies documenting its predicted patterns of risk beliefs, shows that for actual decisions 
individuals are quite unresponsive to differences in probabilities. Thus, a 10% probability may 
count only 1.2 times as much as a 5% probability.
  
31
                                                           
28 See PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND, THE NEED FOR CHANGE: THE LEGACY OF 
TMI 12 (1979) [hereinafter TMI REPORT] (“[T]he radiation doses were so low that we conclude that the overall 
health effects will be minimal. . . . [A] projection derived for the total number of radiation-induced cancers among 
the population affected by the accident at TMI was 0.7.”). 
 And when the probabilities are much smaller 
– as with catastrophic environmental risks – individuals may hardly notice even a ten-fold 
reduction in risk, although this brings about a ten-fold reduction in expected consequences. 
29 Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk, XLVII 
ECONOMETRICA 263-91 (1979). 
30 Political processes reinforce this bias, since politicians are strongly oriented toward “not on my watch” behavior. 
This implies that high probability disasters count much more than low probability disasters that impose much greater 
expected losses. 
31 This result is true more generally when people lack full information and act as rational decision makers. See W. 
Kip Viscusi, Sources of Inconsistency in Societal Responses to Health Risks, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 257-61 (1990). 18 
Untrained decision processes will both overestimate small risks and undervalue significant 
reductions in high-consequence but low probability risks.  
Prescriptive decision analysis, as noted, separates out the consideration of consequences 
and probabilities. Essentially, they are the two different components of outcomes, and there are 
strong supporting normative principles for treating them independently.
32 We recommend 
separation between the two for policymakers and analysts who are attempting to assess 
catastrophic environmental risks. Instead of making distinctions, they should consider that for 
catastrophic outcomes “a risk is a risk is a risk.” Fallacious reasoning came to the fore in 
discussing Japan’s nuclear calamity, where many television analysts, and presumably their 
advisors, lumped the Japan disaster in with Three Mile Island (no documented health loss) and 
Chernobyl (extreme health losses).
33
Once one takes seriously assessing the magnitude of losses from a catastrophe, one 
confronts the disturbing reality that losses from disasters tend to have fat-tailed distributions, i.e., 
distributions where there is a nontrivial chance of extremely large losses. Such distributions look 
nothing like the normal distributions that are familiar in considering for example human heights, 
and that play a central role in most empirical investigations in the social sciences. Even 
lognormal distributions, which pay greater attention to extreme outcomes, do not come close to 
having the fat tails found in the distributions of losses from catastrophes. Disaster losses – such 
as those from earthquakes, hurricanes and floods – are much better described by a power law 
 The first is trivially small relative to the Japan situation, the 
latter many times worse. 
                                                           
32 See HOWARD RAIFFA, DECISION ANALYSIS: INTRODUCTORY LECTURES ON CHOICES UNDER UNCERTAINTY (1968). 
33 See, e.g., Jenny Marder, Japan's Nuclear Crisis: Does it Compare to Three Mile Island, Chernobyl?, PBS 
NEWSHOUR, Mar. 14, 2011. Compare TMI REPORT, supra note X, with CHERNOBYL FORUM, CHERNOBYL’S 
LEGACY: HEALTH, ENVTL. & SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACTS & RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE GOV’TS OF BELARUS, THE 
RUSSIAN FED’N & UKRAINE 7-8 (2d ed. 2005), available at 
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Booklets/Chernobyl/chernobyl.pdf.   19 
distribution. With a power law distribution, the greatest loss may easily be three times or even 
ten times as great as the second greatest loss, whereas no such variation is observed with respect 
to normally distributed variables such as individual height. 
Figure 1 uses the power law scales to illustrate the distribution of fatalities from U.S. 
hurricanes, tornadoes, floods, and earthquakes.
34 The vertical axis is the cumulative number of 
each type of event per year, while the horizontal axis is the number of fatalities per event. Note 
that both scales have a progression in terms of orders of magnitude. For example, on the vertical 
axis 100 is twice as high as is 10, even though 100 is an order of magnitude—i.e., 10 times—
greater than 10. The data indicate roughly linear relationships over two to three orders of 
magnitudes—that is factors of 100 to 1,000—in the number of fatalities.
35
The following examples illustrate the wide variability that may occur in the upper tail of 
the loss distribution. One of the most severe U.S. wildfire losses in terms of acres burned 
occurred was the Yellowstone fires in 1988, which burned about 1.6 million acres.
  
36 Before that, 
the most recent wildfire that burned over 1 million acres was seventy years ago, the 1918 
Cloquet-Moose Lake fire in Minnesota that burned 1.2 million acres.
37
                                                           
34 A variable p(x) has a power law distribution if it can be characterized as p(x) = cx
d, where c and d are constants, 
so that log p(x) = log c + d log x. 
 The largest North 
American oil spill was the 1910 spill Lakeview Gusher in California that poured out 9 million 
35 U.S. Geological Survey, Fact Sheet: Natural Disasters—Forecasting Economic and Life Losses, 
http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/natural-disasters/index.html (last visited May 11, 2011). 
36 See National Interagency Fire Center, Historically Significant Wildland Fires, 
http://www.nifc.gov/fireInfo/fireInfo_stats_histSigFires.html (last visited May 11, 2011). For a sense of the 
variation in monetary losses, see National Fire Protection Association, Deadliest/Large-Loss Fires: The 10 Largest 
Loss Wildland Fires in the U.S., 
http://www.nfpa.org/itemDetail.asp?categoryID=954&itemID=44745&URL=Research/Fire%20statistics/Deadliest/l
arge-loss%20fires (last visited May 11, 2011).  
37 Id. 20 
barrels of oil.
38 The 2010 BP Deepwater Horizon spill ranks second, with 4.9 million barrels.
39 
The 1979 Ixtoc spill off the coast of Mexico generated 3.3 million barrels.
40 Terrorist attacks 
display similar variability. Prior to 9/11, the greatest loss ever was associated with the 1995 
Oklahoma City bombing, when 168 people died.
41 Then on 9/11, nearly 3,000 people lost their 
lives.
42 Finally, the death tolls due to earthquakes are also variable. The deadliest earthquake 
since 1900 is the 1976 Tangshan, China earthquake that officially killed 255,000, although many 
estimate the death toll to be actually as high as 655,000.
43 The 2004 Sumatra earthquake ranks 
second with a death toll of 227,898.
44
There are two implications of catastrophes being characterized by fat-tailed distributions. 
First, where disasters are concerned, the past may not be prologue to the future. A future disaster 
could easily be many times as bad. Second, a single extreme outcome may readily account for 
most of the losses from a particular type of catastrophe. This second implication influences our 
policy recommendation. It would be infeasible to restrict drilling to companies that could cover 
any conceivable cost. Possibly no company qualifies. But to proceed with our everyday 
activities, we must let processes that impose risks go forward. Thus, when they do, we should 
charge the operators for the expected risks they impose beyond the maximum amount that we 
require or could possibly expect that they be able to pay.  
 
                                                           
38 See World’s Largest Oil Spills Map, http://geology.com/articles/largest-oil-spills-map/ (last visited May 11, 
2011). These measures are in terms of barrels of oil. Should the loss be converted to dollars, we would expect even 
more variability. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Oklahoma City Bombing, 
1995, http://www.fema.gov/emergency/usr/usrok95.shtm (last visited May 11, 2011). 
42 See 9/11 Attacks, Fact Box, 
http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference/timestopics/subjects/s/sept_11_2001/attacks/index.html (last visited May 
11, 2011) (listing the number of dead as 2,992). 
43 U.S. Geological Survey, Earthquakes with 50,000 or More Deaths, 
http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/world/most_destructive.php (last visited May 11, 2011). 
44 Id. 21 
The failure to prepare for such unprecedented risks was manifested with respect to the 47 
foot-high tsunami that struck Fukushima in March, 2011:  
In 2002, following new, nonbinding guidelines by a government advisory group, 
Tokyo Electric Power Co., Japan’s biggest utility, raised its maximum projected 
tsunami at Fukushima Daiichi to between 17.7 and 18.7 feet—considerably higher 
than the 13-foot-high bluff. Yet the company appeared to respond only by raising 
the level of an electric pump near the coast by 8 inches, presumably to protect it 
from high water, regulators said. 
 
“We can only work on precedent, and there was no precedent,” said Tsuneo 
Futami, a former Tokyo Electric nuclear engineer who was the director of 
Fukushima Daiichi in the late 1990s. “When I headed the plant, the thought of a 
tsunami never crossed my mind.”
45
 
 
 
Insurance Principles, Compensation, and Nontransferable Losses 
  A central policy objective beyond generating an efficient level of safety is to provide 
appropriate levels of compensation for environmental harms. There are many potential rationales 
for compensating injuries caused by environmental disasters, the most important arising when 
the victims have property rights to the resource that has been lost. In that instance, it is widely 
viewed as fair and equitable that they be compensated. But quite apart from restoring equity, 
payment of compensation usually performs two additional functions: deterring excess risks 
through a liability system, and providing efficient insurance.  
The insurance function of compensation seeks to provide efficient risk spreading for 
those who have lost value. The standard rationale for the insurance function of liability is that 
addressing financial losses is desirable because most people tend to be risk-averse. Liability 
payments that restore people to their level of financial well-being that prevailed before the harm 
occurred will generally be desirable. The “make whole” principle for setting damages for 
                                                           
45 Norimitsu Onishi & James Glanz, Old Science on Tsunami Risk Guided by Japan’s Nuclear Rules, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 27, 2011. 22 
financial loss, apart from its equity accomplishments, simultaneously achieves an optimal level 
of insurance for such losses. 
  However, this insurance analogy and the desirability of making people whole does not 
carry over to nontransferable goods, such as environmental quality or severe adverse health 
effects , both frequent consequences of environmental catastrophes. People will surely regret 
suffering environmental damage, and payment of money could improve their well-being, and 
perhaps even get them back to their original level of welfare. But even if there were no liability 
or compensation system, one would not expect people to purchase insurance that would provide 
them a monetary payment if the environment is harmed since money and environmental 
resources are not easily substitutable goods. 
The inability of money to substitute for nontransferable losses is particularly evident for 
situations involving fatalities, the most severe form of health loss. Compensation levels in 
wrongful death cases do not involve payment levels sufficient to restore the person’s well-being 
to the same level as when alive. For starters, after a person’s death the deceased cannot reap any 
direct welfare benefits from such payments so that even posing the question in terms of making 
the victim whole is either an irrelevant abstraction or a logical impossibility. Similarly, 
anticipation of such a bequest before death will rarely make a person indifferent to a fatal injury.  
The widespread lack of substitutability between money and health has been documented 
empirically for job-related injuries.
46
                                                           
46 W. Kip Viscusi & Williams N. Evans, Utility Functions that Depend on Health Status: Estimates and Economic 
Implications, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 353-74 (1990). 
 Serious injuries often impede a person’s ability to increase 
individual welfare through financial expenditures. Because serious injuries reduce the degree to 23 
which money enhances well-being, people would generally choose insurance coverage that falls 
far short of the amount needed to restore them to the pre-injury level of welfare.
47
  Similarly, if environmental harms are not readily reversed through monetary expenditure, 
there will be no compelling rationale for insurance. The same argument applies to environmental 
injuries that don’t hurt humans directly. Millions of Americans may feel that they are injured 
because sea turtles will no longer frequent certain areas of the Gulf of Mexico, but these are not 
the types of losses that can be replaced by paying people for the loss.  
  
Consequently, in the case of environmental harms from oil spills, the emphasis should be 
on ameliorating the environmental harm to an efficient level rather than compensating the public 
for the lessened value of the environmental amenity that they experience. The emphasis of 
current policies on restoration for environmental losses rather than direct payments to the 
citizenry is well founded.
48
 
 To the extent that there is a deterrence rationale for additional 
sanctions, such funds should be paid to the U.S. Treasury rather than to any particular parties 
who experience a loss. 
The Current Liability Structure: Retrospective Liability 
There are two different law and economics approaches that can generate efficient liability 
regimes from the standpoint of deterrence—payment of the full damages for the harm after the 
harm has occurred and payment ex ante of an amount equal to the expected loss, what could be 
                                                           
47 More technically, if actuarially fair insurance is available, a rational individual will purchase sufficient insurance 
so that his marginal utility of income is constant across states. If back pain does not affect the marginal utility of 
income, then one would not insure at all against an injury causing such pain. Indeed, if back pain prevented one 
from engaging in an expensive recreation, say skiing, then suffering pain would reduce the marginal utility of 
income. A rational person would anti-insure, paying in the bad state (back pain) to have more money in the good 
state (unimpaired). 
48Determining what level of recovery achieves restoration is not always straightforward because the resources being 
restored may have been evolving even in the absence of the spill. See BP COMM’N REPORT, supra note 1, at 212. 24 
thought of as paying the expected value of the externality one is imposing.
49 Ex ante payments 
are more than hypothetical policy designs. Carbon taxes could be viewed as a way of charging 
firms for pollution costs ex ante, and regulatory sanctions for violations in situations in which no 
harm has occurred likewise can similarly serve a prospective deterrence role. Our tiered liability 
proposal will incorporate a prospective liability component of tax changes for externalities 
beyond the damages amount that the company can pay. Standard analyses of the deterrence 
equivalence of the retrospective and prospective liability approaches generally deal with the 
simple financial loss case, which is a useful starting point for conceptualizing the issues.
50
  Under the conventional retrospective liability approach, payment for all the damages 
leads the injurer to internalize the costs and to take appropriate levels of care. This liability 
system, which follows the usual tort law approach, also generates damages payments that can be 
used for purposes of compensation, thus serving a dual function. There are two principal 
requirements for this approach to be workable. First, it must be possible to determine the 
magnitude of the harm. Rarely is this task straightforward for catastrophic losses. For example, 
there is still no approximate price tag available for the financial and environmental damage 
caused by the BP Deepwater Horizon spill. Second, the injurer must be able to pay the damages. 
If the defendant has insufficient resources, then the full damages that might be paid will be 
effectively capped, and deterrence incentives will be insufficient. For that reason we propose that 
firms demonstrate the financial resources to pay for damages equivalent to those imposed by the 
 
                                                           
49 John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Incentive-based Decentralization: Expected-Externality Payment Induced 
Efficient Behavior in Groups, in ARROW AND THE ASCENT OF MODERN ECONOMIC THEORY 439-83 (George R. 
Feiwel ed., 1987). 
50 In addition, if the expected loss amounts are equal to the amount of damages, then this formulation also imposes 
at least an implicit assumption of risk neutrality. If the harm leads to large losses to particular individuals who are 
risk-averse, then the appropriate measure of losses is the certainty equivalent of the harm. 25 
BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill. Another minimum benchmark for any operator might be chosen. 
What is critical is that it be substantial.  
Given the fat tails associated with the distribution of losses from catastrophes, it is 
frequently impossible or undesirable to limit risky activities solely to firms that can pay any 
conceivable level of damages. Hence, we recommend below a two-tier liability system for such 
activities. At the first tier, the responsible party would have to show a significant ability to pay 
for the likely range of losses through its assets and insurance should there be an accident. The 
second tier would address possible losses beyond this level. We propose that firms pay a tax to 
cover the potential expected damages amount beyond the level financial resources that the firm 
has demonstrated it has available to pay claims.  
Both the Clean Water Act
51 and the Oil Pollution Act of 1990
52 (“OPA”) include liability 
provisions pertaining to oil spills. OPA is the principal federal statute pertaining to the damages 
caused by oil spills and is the focus of the discussion here. Other federal statutes may also be 
pertinent depending on the nature and consequences of the spill.
53 The OPA provides for strict, 
joint and several liability for the damages caused by oil spills.
54 The damages components 
pertain to financial consequences as well as natural resource damages. In particular, the pertinent 
damages include removal costs and damages to natural resources, real or personal property, 
subsistence use, revenues, profits and earning capacity, and public services.
55
                                                           
51 33 U.S.C. § 1321, § 311. 
 Thus, under § 
2702(b)(2)(B) of the United States Code claimants can recover “injury to, or economic losses 
resulting from destruction of, real or personal property” if the claimant “own or leases that 
52 Id. §§ 2701-61.  
53 See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (“CERLCA”), 42 U.S.C. § 9607; 
National Marine Sanctuaries Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1443; Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1653. 
54 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a). 
55 Id. § 2702(b). 26 
property.” Other financial losses are addressed under § 2702(b)(2)(C), which permits “any 
claimant” to recover “[d]amages equal to the loss of profits or impairment of earning capacity 
due to injury, destruction, or loss of real property, personal property, or natural resource.” 
Damages for the loss or destruction of natural resources are addressed under § 2702(b)(2)(C).  
The total amount of damages is subject to various caps depending on the entity 
responsible for the spill, such as the type of vessel or whether it was an offshore facility.
56 For oil 
spills resulting from offshore facilities as in the BP situation, the applicable cap on all damages 
paid is $75 million.
57 This cap is set at such a paltry level that damages paid will be meaningless 
for major spills such as the BP Deepwater Horizon spill. However, these caps are no longer 
binding in situations of gross negligence, willful misconduct, or violation of applicable Federal 
regulations pertaining to safety, construction, or operation.
58 The existence of a massive oil spill 
could potentially lead jurors to conclude that the company was guilty of gross negligence. Such 
judgments may be appropriate, or may be influenced by hindsight bias, with jurors assuming that 
the company either knew or should have known that the spill would have occurred given its 
current practices.
59
The OPA provides for three different measures of natural resource damages: 
  
The measure of natural resource damages under § 2702(b)(2)(A) of this title is: 
(A)  the cost of restoring, rehabilitating, replacing, or acquiring the equivalent 
of, the damaged natural resources; 
(B)  the diminution in value of those natural resources pending restoration; plus 
(C)  the reasonable cost of assessing these damages.
60
                                                           
56 Id. § 2704(a). 
 
57 Id. § 2704(a)(3). 
58 id. § 2704 (c)(1). 
59 See W. Kip Viscusi, Do Judges Do Better?, in CASS SUNSTEIN ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: HOW JURIES DECIDE 
188 (2002); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571 
(1998). 
60 33 U.S.C. § 2706(d)(1). 27 
The OPA also provides for some coverage of the losses from a spill. If the responsible 
party is unable to pay for all the damages, those who have been injured by the spill can apply for 
reimbursement from the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund,
61 which provides for damages payments 
of up to $1 billion per oil spill incident. That larger amount was also dwarfed by the actual harm 
from the BP spill.
62
The current damages regime for oil spills consequently follows the retrospective liability 
approach. The company causing the damage is responsible for both the financial harm and the 
environmental damage. Monetary payments to those who have suffered losses are appropriate for 
financial harm, whereas the favored remedy for environmental damage is restoration and 
remediation to bring the resource back to its pre-spill condition. Except in situations in which the 
company is guilty of specified infractions, such as regulatory violations and gross negligence, as 
mentioned, damages are capped at $75 million.
   
63 However, in the case of the BP Deepwater 
Horizon spill, BP voluntarily waived this cap but denied gross negligence.
64 This waiver was 
made under considerable outside pressure: President Obama stated in his address to the nation on 
the BP spill: “I will inform [the chairman of BP] that he is to set aside whatever resources are 
required to compensate the workers and business owners who have been harmed as a result of his 
company’s recklessness.”
65
It is noteworthy that BP waived the $75 million cap and agreed to pay billions in 
damages even though there had been no legal determination that the cap did not bind. However, 
  
                                                           
61 Id. § 2712(a)(4). 
62 26 U.S.C. § 9509(c)(2). 
63 33 U.S.C. § 2704(a)(3). 
64 Statement of BP Exploration & Production Inc. re Applicability of Limit of Liability under Oil Pollution Act of 
1990 at 1, In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mexico, on Apr. 20, 2010, MDL No. 
2779 (E.D. La. Oct. 18, 2010), http://www.laed.uscourts.gov/OilSpill/Orders/BPStatement.pdf (last visited May 11, 
2011). 
65 Barack Obama, U.S. President, Remarks by the President to the Nation on the BP Oil Spill (June 15, 2010), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-nation-bp-oil-spill. 28 
the prospects for retaining such a cap appeared dim given that President Obama had concluded 
that the company was guilty of “recklessness.”
66
  In theory, both strict liability and negligence standards can produce efficient outcomes. 
We advocate strict liability with the responsible party identified in advance for several reasons. 
Determining whether a company is negligent requires a difficult assessment of the ex ante 
benefits and costs of safety, but strict liability has no such informational requirement. Deepwater 
drilling involving multiple contractors whose actions cannot be readily monitored externally also 
complicates the task of apportioning blame and determining the relative negligence of the 
different parties. Making the oil drilling operator responsible puts a large and knowledgeable 
firm, and one with authority, in charge of the safety decisions. The operator can, of course, work 
out contractual arrangements with the various contractors to shift some of the liability burden. 
While a negligence standard would reduce the transactions costs of a flurry of lawsuits, major oil 
spills from deepwater drilling are likely to be relatively infrequent events.
 BP also had at stake its corporate reputation and 
its ability to market its products to U.S. consumers, which might have been affected had it not 
paid for the harm that had been imposed. From BP’s standpoint, traditional economic/legal 
considerations were swamped by overwhelming political forces. 
67
                                                           
66 Id. 
 The essence of our 
proposed arrangement is that we should have a single equivalent of a residual claimant (from 
whom to collect damages), and that this party should be large, knowledgeable, and have the 
power to engage whichever other parties it wishes to carry out its mission. This is the best way to 
place incentives in the hands of the party that knows the most, and that has the greatest ability to 
67 A traditional contributory negligence approach often involves looking at the behavior of the injured party. Thus, 
driver A may have been a bit reckless when he crashed into B as he was passing, but B may have wandered into his 
lane, which would exonerate A. The equivalent in the oil spill case would be exonerating the operator because the 
fisherman should not have set up his operation in a zone close to a deepwater oil well. Such reasoning, if allowed to 
stand when one party imposes catastrophic risks on many others, would impede a broad range of economic activity. 
When you buy a house, it should not be your responsibility to assess whether the factory nearby is a fire hazard.  29 
control the outcome. Under our proposal, the responsible party in turn can contract with the other 
companies involved in the drilling and can specify the circumstances under which they will be 
liable and the amount of this liability. Moreover, the responsible party also will have an incentive 
to monitor the behavior of the other companies involved. That multiple parties may be at fault 
was borne out in the report by the Coast Guard, which placed substantial blame on Transocean 
Ltd., which operated the drilling rig.
68
  Because of the potential contribution to the accident of its drilling contractors, BP has 
filed several lawsuits in an effort to recoup some of the damages it incurred.
  
69 As one might 
expect based on the Coast Guard report, BP has sued Transocean Ltd.
70 Moreover, BP has filed a 
lawsuit against Cameron International Corp., which manufactured what BP termed a 
“dangerous” blowout preventer and, in BP’s view, was negligent.
71 BP has also sued 
Halliburton, alleging misconduct and fraud.
72
Determining the value of losses is far from a simple accounting exercise. In the case of 
financial harms, the task is to determine who has been harmed and to what extent. As in standard 
damages assessments, the task is to determine the income (or property value) trajectory people 
would have had if the spill had not occurred, the income path they have experienced to date and 
are expected to have in the future, and then to determine the difference between these in 
calculating the loss people have experienced as a result of the spill. For any given person to be 
 Under our proposal, BP would shoulder the 
liability but would still be able to sue its partners unless the contracts with the partners absolved 
them of all liability. 
                                                           
68 See, e.g., John M. Broder, Companies, Crews, and Regulators Share Blame in Coast Guard Report on Oil Spill, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2011; Russell Gold & Angel Gonzalez, Spill Report Faults Transocean Rig, WALL ST. J., Apr. 
23-24, 2011. 
69 See, e.g., Lawrence Hurley, BP Sues 3 Companies Over Alleged Roles in Deepwater Horizon Spill, GREENWIRE, 
Apr. 21, 2011. 
70 See Aude  Lagorce, BP Sues Halliburton, Transocean, Cameron, MARKET WATCH, Apr. 21, 2011. 
71 See Russell Gold, BP Sues Maker of Blowout Preventer, WALL ST. J., Apr. 21, 2011. 
72 See Guy Chazan, BP Sues Halliburton Over Gulf Disaster, WALL ST. J., Apr. 21, 2011.  30 
compensated such calculations may be difficult because of the confounding effects of the 
prolonged recession that began in 2008. Disentangling the effects of the spill from that of 
macroeconomic conditions on, for example, hotel revenues, would be difficult.   
There is the related issue of who should be included in the set of people meriting 
compensation. How broadly should the compensation be structured? If a hotel has suffered a loss 
in revenues due to the spill and receives compensation, should all the suppliers to the hotel be 
compensated as well? Are there geographic boundaries to such compensation? If these suppliers 
are located in quite different parts of the country, should they also be compensated? More 
generally, given the ripple effects of all economic activity, where should the line be drawn? Our 
approach under policy proposal 5 is to make payment for the direct effects only, recognizing that 
such payments in turn will generate additional economic activity as well. This approach is the 
norm in personal injury cases as, for example, after a wrongful death, there is a payment to the 
survivors for the earnings that the person has lost, but there is no payment to all the stores where 
the deceased would have spent money. 
  A potentially challenging issue is how to treat losses not caused by the spill but which 
were generated by misperceptions generated by the spill rather than being “due to” the spill.
73
Already, this oil spill is the worst environmental disaster America has ever faced. 
And unlike an earthquake or a hurricane, it’s not a single event that does damage 
in a matter of minutes or days. The millions of gallons of oil that have spilled into 
 
The spill garnered enormous media attention and was the subject of an Oval Office address by 
President Obama, who said:  
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the Gulf of Mexico are more like an epidemic, one that we will be fighting for 
months and even years.
74
Newspapers likewise ran stories suggesting major threats to tourism due to the spill.
  
75 Coupled 
with repeated front page coverage of the spill and its threat to the Gulf beaches, it is not 
surprising that there was a consumer reaction, included unwarranted responses to inaccurate 
news coverage that implied that the beaches were far more tarnished than they were.
76 The BP 
spill led to a substantial drop in tourism at Gulf Coast beaches even for beaches that were not 
affected by the spill. Given the media coverage dramatizing the historic nature of the magnitude 
of the spill and the forecasts of catastrophic effects, people might well have rationally chosen to 
act on their misperceptions and alter their vacation plans even though their fears proved to be 
unfounded. Losses due to loss of consumer confidence are not compensable under current laws, 
but these are real losses that could potentially be avoided by credible risk communication 
efforts.
77
 
 Given the financial self-interest of the companies responsible for the spill, to be 
believed, such communication might best be handled by governmental entities. 
Who Should Pay for the Damages? 
  As noted above, the current liability regime established by OPA provides for strict, joint 
and several liability. However, with a damages cap of $75 million except in situations such as 
gross negligence, the seemingly stringent liability regime that in effect treats oil spills in a 
manner similar to the treatment of hazardous substance sites under CERCLA is not nearly as 
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stringent as it might appear if implemented literally.
78
  In assessing the appropriateness of the liability regime, the first issue is whether the 
drilling firms should be subject to strict liability rather than some other legal requirement such as 
a negligence standard. With a strict liability standard, the oil firm is responsible for all the harm 
associated with drilling, even if the firm exercises an exemplary level of care. Under a 
negligence standard, the firm would only be liable if its level of care fell below a reasonable 
standard of care, such as striking an efficient balance between risk and cost.  
 Moreover, without a truly meaningful 
financial resource requirement imposed on firms that are permitted to undertake deepwater 
drilling operations, the actual cap on damages paid would be merely the net worth of the firm 
plus its insurance, even if the firm is guilty of gross negligence. In some instances, that could be 
even less than $75 million.  
A strict liability standard is preferable to a negligence standard for deepwater drilling 
operations for several reasons. First, a negligence standard requires both a determination of the 
standard of care used to judge negligence and a determination of whether the oil firm met that 
standard. Either of these determinations would be a challenging task. Oil drilling operations are 
extremely complex, require considerable specialized expertise and, even with such expertise, 
fully understanding the appropriate levels of care is extremely difficult for external observers. 
Given the information gap between what is known by the company and what can be determined 
by outside observers, a strict liability standard offers the advantage of overcoming the 
informational asymmetry problem. With a strict liability standard, only the oil firm need know 
what the efficient level of care is and whether the firm has met it.  
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Second, there is a random element to all human behavior that is difficult to predict. And 
accidents combine that randomness with the uncertainties associated with technologies and 
nature. The oil company may have adopted sound technologies and training programs for its 
workers so that from an institutional standpoint its actions are responsible, but nevertheless 
accidents, sometimes even catastrophic accidents, do occur. As drilling operations proceed and 
unexpected complications arise, there may be no existing guidelines for these situations. The 
Commission’s review of the BP spill identified numerous such judgmental errors made under 
conditions of substantial stress and unanticipated conditions, despite fierce incentives for BP to 
get things right.
79
In the case of the BP oil spill, three major firms were involved in the operations: BP, 
Halliburton, and Transocean. BP is the largest owner of tracts in the Gulf, as it owns more than 
1,500 tracts in areas where the water is more than 1,500 feet and owns more than one-third of all 
the deepwater reserves.
 A strict liability standard avoids the task of determining whether the company 
had been negligent in the training, monitoring, and operations procedures. 
80 It is also the fourth largest petroleum company in the world, with 
revenues of $297 billion in 2010
81 Halliburton is an energy products company with substantial 
oil drilling activities, with revenues in 2010 of $18.0 billion.
82 Transocean is the largest 
contractor of offshore oil rigs in the world, with revenues in 2009 of $11.6 billion.
83
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 The 
National Commission identified significant errors made by each of these three companies, where 
80 Id. at 47. 
81 Id. at 2. BP, FINANCIAL AND OPERATING INFORMATION 2006-2010 at 7 (2011), 
http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/STAGING/global_assets/downloads/F/FOI_2006_2010_full_bo
ok.pdf (last visited May 16, 2011). 
82 Halliburton, Financial Reports (2011), http://ir.halliburton.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=67605&p=irol-reportsOther (last 
visited May 16, 2010). For cementing operations alone, Halliburton had $1.7 billion in business in 2009. BP 
COMM’N REPORT, supra note 1, at 224. 
83 BP COMM’N REPORT, supra note 1, at 2. 34 
these errors contributed to the likelihood of the spill and the extent of the harm.
84 With eight 
different principal causes of the accident involving these three companies, sorting out the 
respective responsibility for the accident would be an impossible task.
85
The responsibility for a spill involving multiple parties can be allocated in various ways. 
The approach under OPA is to impose joint and several liability. If the oil firm’s resources are 
not sufficient to pay for the damages, the other firms involved in the operation are liable for any 
excess. With a $75 million damages cap, the joint and several aspect does not establish much of 
a deterrent except to avoid situations involving gross negligence, in which case the cap would no 
longer apply.   
 Imposing a strict 
liability standard with the oil drilling firm being responsible for all losses eliminates the daunting 
task of extent to which negligence by each of these companies contributed to the damage. 
An efficient economic solution is to make all firms involved liable for the full costs of an 
oil spill so that each firm when making its safety decisions would take into account the full value 
of the losses that will occur should there be an accident. Such an approach is not feasible in 
practice because it will lead to the full amount of the damages being paid multiple times by each 
firm involved in the accident. Moreover, assuming full liability will discourage subcontractors 
from being involved in the drilling operation. And collusion among firms, who together would 
be paying much more than the actual costs should there be an accident, would actually lead to 
excess safety. 
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Our proposal for determining how payment should be made for an oil spill has four 
separate components. Our policy proposal 5A states that there should be no cap on damages 
payments. The current $75 million cap except in situations such as gross negligence makes the 
responsible firm liable for only a small portion of the damage from any major spill. In order to 
generate the appropriate incentives for care in a strict liability regime, the oil drilling firm must 
be responsible for all the harm that its actions generate.  
Removal of the damages cap, or indeed any measure that leads to an increase in expected 
damages paid after an accident, could lead small firms with limited financial resources to engage 
in the activity. They would be able to effectively cap their damages by being unable to pay them. 
To avoid the problems associated with insolvency, we have made our policy proposal 4, which is 
that before being allowed to drill, the oil company must be able to demonstrate the financial 
resources or adequate insurance that is sufficient to pay for most possible harms. Current 
financial requirements, which are on the order of $35 million to $150 million for different 
offshore facilities, are more than two orders of magnitude below the kind of worst case scenario 
that did in fact occur with the BP oil spill.
86 More typically, the amount is between $10 million 
and $35 million depending on the facility,
87 where the President under current law can increase 
the amount up to $150 million.
88
Imposing such a resource requirement will prevent many small businesses from being 
able to engage in deepwater drilling, which is a development that is of concern to small business 
 Existing financial resource requirements must be dramatically 
strengthened. 
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advocates and has led to political opposition to raising the cap.
89 However, in our view there is 
no sound rationale for permitting firms to engage in activities that threaten the risk of 
catastrophic harms that will not be addressed. Moreover, if small firms are permitted to operate 
in such an environment, with the ability to escape the ultimate costs of their actions, these firms 
will not have an economic incentive to incorporate the costs of potential risky outcomes when 
making their safety decisions. Inadequate levels of care will result.
90
Our policy proposals 1 and 2 replace the current OPA joint and several liability provision 
with full liability being imposed on the oil company that owns the lease. Thus, rather than 
requiring that all companies involved in the drilling operation demonstrate adequate financial 
resources to cover potential damages, this requirement would only be imposed on the well 
operator. 
  
Given the structure of our proposal, imposing this liability will also create substantial 
incentives for the company to monitor the safety-related decisions of its drilling partners, and to 
influence those decisions through contractual arrangements should those partners contribute to 
an accident. A consistent theme of the President’s Commission report is that assessment of the 
safety practices and technologies requires highly specialized expertise that the government 
currently does not have and is unlikely to ever develop because people with that expertise are 
highly paid, well above levels in the government pay range. As a fallback solution the 
Commission suggests various alternatives such as, in effect, borrowing the talent using an 
approach patterned after that employed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. But even if the 
                                                           
89 There may, however, be possible insurance options that would enable smaller firms to operate. BP COMM’N 
REPORT, supra note 1, at 246. However, note that the possibility of obtaining insurance coverage may be reduced if 
all liability caps are removed. 
90 An alternative would be to fully regulate their activities to assure an appropriate standard of care. We argue 
throughout that information asymmetries make incentives rather than regulation the preferred manner for dealing 
with offshore drilling risks. Moreover, even with appropriate standards of care, accidents will happen. With small 
operators, desirable compensation would not be available. 37 
government is successful in devising a make shift administrative solution to assembling the 
requisite talent, that will only be available for reviews of continuing safety practices and actual 
disasters. However, the myriad decisions that the Commission identified as contributing to the 
BP oil spill for the most part were well beyond standard operating procedures. Responsibility for 
monitoring should be the primary task for the oil company operating the well, the responsible 
party, which has both the superior technical expertise and the on-the-field knowledge to better 
promote safety than do government regulators. 
Deepwater drilling operations are complex and, by necessity, may involve multiple 
companies bringing their distinctive types of expertise. Under our proposed damages regime, 
which makes the oil company fully responsible for the damages, there would be a disincentive to 
partner with others if their safety decisions would not be expected to reflect appropriate care. 
Even in the case of the BP oil spill, BP operated the well, and was best situated to monitor 
safety-related actions as well as the activities of its two main contractors, Halliburton and 
Transocean.
91
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 Our policy proposal 1 addresses this issue. The oil company is the responsible 
party in the first place. However, it can establish a liability structure of its own, defining the 
circumstances under which its drilling partners are responsible for damages and the level of these 
damages payments should a spill occur, depending on how the parties performed, etc. Thus, the 
oil firm and the drilling partners can agree to contractual arrangements that ensure that the oil 
firm is able to be compensated appropriately for any financial harms attributable to its drilling 
partners. It will be the responsibility of the oil company to ascertain whether its collaborators 
have adequate financial resources and/or insurance, since the failure of these companies to 
reimburse the oil company for damages caused by its activities will not reduce the oil company’s 
liability.  38 
 
Punitive Damages 
  Our proposed liability regime eliminates any productive role for punitive damages. Thus, 
under our proposal 5B firms should bear no punitive damages. Unlike the current liability 
structure, which caps damages at $75 million except under circumstances that closely follow 
criteria for punitive damages (such as “gross negligence”), our proposal number 5A removes any 
damages cap. The responsible firm is liable for all damages that are incurred. This structure 
establishes incentives both sufficient and efficient from the standpoint of deterrence as well as 
appropriate levels of insurance. Eliminating the possibility of punitive damages has precedent; 
the Price-Anderson Act has done precisely this for nuclear power.
92
  Consider first the adequacy of deterrence if punitive damages are eliminated. In situations 
where damages amounts are set equal to the level of the harm, such amounts will establish 
efficient levels of deterrence except when the probability of detection is below 1.0.
 
93
  Punitive damages likewise have no constructive role from the standpoint of 
compensation. The insurable losses associated with financial harms are included in the required 
compensatory damages payments for which the oil firm is liable. For environmental harms for 
 However, 
catastrophic oil spills are paradigmatic cases of highly visible harms. Unlike midnight dumping 
of hazardous wastes, where the likelihood that a perpetrator will escape detection makes punitive 
damages desirable as a way to multiply damages, a catastrophic spill is sure to be noticed and its 
origin to be identifiable. 
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of damages and p is the probability of detection. 39 
which money is not a suitable substitute, the firm is required to undertake all appropriate 
remediation efforts. For any shortfalls of or delays in the remediation, the firm is liable for the 
remaining natural resource damages. There are no gaps in the damages payment structure that 
need be addressed through punitive damages. 
  Missing from this discussion is a possible role of punitive damages from the standpoint of 
punishment, up and beyond its deterrent or compensatory role. Given the much more stringent 
liability system that we have proposed, firms will already be punished by much more than they 
are on average under the current liability system, since they will not enjoy any damages cap and 
will be required to have the financial resources to pay very large damages claims.  
Our proposal eliminates the severe risk of the misapplication of punitive damages as a 
form of punishment for catastrophic environmental harms. To the extent that jurors evaluate 
behavior by the level of the harm that has been incurred rather than by whether firms have struck 
an efficient balance between risk and cost, there will be a tendency to award punitive damages 
for major oil spills irrespective of whether the company has struck that balance appropriately.
94
 
 
Our proposal eliminates the risk of erroneous jury judgments, and establishes a liability structure 
that provides strong incentives for prudence and that secures damages payment for most 
accidents, and raises a tax fund that could be used for payments in case of catastrophic losses. 
Prospective Liability and Government Regulation 
Recognizing that not all companies have sufficiently deep pockets, one might instead 
adopt the prospective liability approach in which companies pay in advance for the expected 
losses that their activities might inflict. Indeed, the tax on noncompensable risk component of 
our proposal adopts this framework. The building blocks for this analysis are different and much 
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more demanding than those of retrospective liability. Instead of knowing the magnitude of the 
harm that has actually occurred, for the prospective liability approach to be workable one must 
be able to ascertain the distribution of possible harms that might occur and the probabilities 
associated with their different levels of damages. In particular, for unpredicted risks with a fat-
tailed distribution, precise judgments of this type are difficult to make. The informational 
requirements of a prospective liability regime, and the potential for error, dwarf those associated 
with retrospective liability, which is why we use retrospective liability of the responsible party as 
our core incentive mechanism. 
The main advantage of prospective liability is that by scaling down the payments to the 
expected losses rather than the actual losses inflicted, paying the costs will become feasible for a 
broader population of firms. More companies will pay for the expected prospective damages, 
including those that do not experience any adverse events, thus creating incentives to foster safe 
drilling operations. The main ingredient that is missing when compared to the usual retrospective 
liability solution is that the prospective penalties are not linked to any payment by the 
responsible firm to those who have suffered the harm. 
Although the prospective liability approach need not entail such compensation, it could 
do so by placing the expected liability cost payments in a compensation fund not unlike the 
current Oil Liability Trust Fund. In the long run, if charges were appropriately tallied, such a 
fund should be able to address the losses incurred provided that the risks and losses are assessed 
accurately and a major disaster does not occur before adequate resources have been accumulated 
in such a fund. Moreover, unlike the retrospective liability situation, damages would not be 41 
limited by the risk of insolvency.
95
  Under our proposal, despite its strong focus on liability and incentives, government 
regulations will still have a continuing, albeit altered role. Indeed, regulation will be expanded in 
the area of ascertaining whether all companies engaged in deepwater drilling have adequate 
financial resources to be engaged in such dangerous activities. However, in recognition of the 
inability of regulators to determine and monitor efficient levels of safety, we rely on incentives 
created by liability to achieve that goal. Thus, the principal regulatory task is not with respect to 
assessing safety practices and technologies but rather determining the financial capability of the 
firm operating the well.  
 Our proposed two-tier liability system would rely on 
payments by the responsible firm to cover damages, with the money raised by the tax only used 
for compensation for damages exceeding the firm’s financial resources.  
  Government regulators will continue to have responsibility as well for establishing broad 
safety standards, as under the current regulatory regime. Note that to separate the regulatory 
oversight, management, and revenue functions, the organizational structure at the Department of 
the Interior was altered after the spill as the Minerals Management Service was reorganized into 
three separate entities with distinct missions: the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, 
Regulation, and Enforcement, the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement, and the 
Office of Natural Resources Revenue.
96
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these activities could be bolstered based on what has been learned about institutional 
shortcomings from the BP oil spill. However, unlike the Commission, we are much less sanguine 
about the ultimate ability of government regulators to fully address the safety concerns involved 
in offshore drilling, or a range of other advanced technology tasks that have the potential to 
impose major risks. Government regulators failed at the oversight task for the BP spill, and there 
is no reason to believe that they will have the capability to control safety-related decisions 
adequately, which is why we have established a liability structure that makes the oil company 
responsible for ensuring well safety. Moreover, while the regulators can levy civil and criminal 
penalties for various infractions, the total financial incentives create by these penalties is modest. 
The U.S. Deptartment of the Interior levied only $919,000 penalties in 2009 and $1,595,000 in 
the first two quarters of 2010.
97
An inherent drawback of government regulation is that government salaries for 
professionally qualified personnel, such as engineers, are unlikely to attract workers with the 
requisite skill levels to effectively undertake the required tasks.
 
98 Government regulators 
previously responsible for oversight fell short in terms of their technical expertise.
99 This 
deficiency is unlikely to be remedied in the future, as pay rates for those working on the rigs, 
including management positions, run well into six figures.
100
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effectively.
101
  Why is deepwater drilling a special case in which government regulation is inadequate 
given that the government is able to regulate other activities, such as those generating air 
pollution and water pollution, that impinge on the environment? Deepwater drilling is hardly the 
only such technologically sophisticated industrial activity. However, most other environmental 
regulatory tasks differ in important aspects. Monitoring emissions and waste water discharges 
can be done on a continuing basis, where any particular emission or discharge has only a minor 
relative impact. Government regulators likewise are able to monitor whether an oil spill disaster 
has occurred, but the stakes are quite different, and the opportunity for learning much less, when 
dealing with a one-time-only situation of catastrophic environmental harm. 
 The talent deficiency is sufficient to ensure that, primary responsibility for 
securing safety should not be through regulatory controls. Moreover, even if there were 
government expertise, there is a profound informational asymmetry in favor of the operator. It 
has far greater knowledge of its technologies, operations, and procedures. For these reasons, our 
proposals shift the preponderance of the responsibility for safety to the oil drilling company.  
  Generally, government regulators can obtain and utilize information regarding safety-
related behavior in order to target its regulatory energies reasonably effectively. One approach is 
to monitor minor mishaps, smaller spills, and accidents that suggest a lax corporate culture, and 
to use such performance records in choosing which facilities warrant greater scrutiny. In this 
context, BP has had a troubled record of safety violations including an oil refinery explosion that 
killed 15 workers in Texas, a major spill in Alaska due to a corroded pipeline, and a lengthy 
history of safety management problems.
102
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 That BP also had a major oil spill was not a one-time 
adverse event that tarnished an otherwise exemplary safety record.
  
102 Id. at 2, 221. 44 
 
Procedures for Compensatory Damages Payments 
  Much of the payment of financial compensation after the BP oil spill was and will be 
conducted through an administrative compensation scheme. After negotiations with President 
Obama, BP established a $20 billion fund for damages.
103 As of May 12, 2011, the fund had paid 
out $4.51 billion to individuals and businesses and $1.27 billion to government entities.
104 
Payments to individuals and businesses are handled through the Gulf Coast Claims Facility,
105 
while governmental claims are handled separately.
106
  The operation of the Gulf Coast Claims Facility, which is administered by Kenneth 
Feinberg, has been as follows. Participation in the program is voluntary, as people could choose 
to file a damages claim without availing themselves of the administrative compensation 
structure. The criteria for receiving payment involves demonstrating a financial loss from the BP 
spill.
 This fund approach provided payments to 
those who suffered financial loss at a far more expeditious pace than they would have 
experienced by filing individual lawsuits, though many claims are still being processed. 
107 The particular categories of loss covered parallel those under OPA, and include claims 
for “removal and clean up costs, damage to real or personal property, lost earnings of profits, 
loss of subsistence use of natural resources, or physical injury or death.”
108 Nonfinancial harms, 
such as mental anguish and stress resulting from the spill, are not covered.
109
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fund reimbursed governmental costs such as the costs incurred by the states of Louisiana and 
Florida for seafood testing.
110
 
 For any compensation system there will always be questions about 
whether the calculations of the losses were accurate and whether the compensation addressed all 
pertinent losses and only pertinent losses. Overall, in our view this compensation fund approach 
performed reasonably well in terms of providing appropriate compensation according to the 
insurance principles advocated above. 
Natural Resource Damages 
  The BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico is the largest offshore oil spill in U.S. history, and 
one of the largest oil spills ever recorded. Costs associated with stopping the spill, cleanup of the 
damages it caused, financial losses imposed on businesses and workers, remediation of natural 
resource damages, and compensation for natural resource damages losses are among the 
prominent loss components. The degree to which the responsible parties should clean up the spill 
and undertake remediation efforts should depend on the benefits derived from those efforts and 
the costs of doing them. Under our proposal 6, the emphasis should be on remediation. However, 
remediation should only be carried out where and to the extent that benefits exceed the costs. A 
natural resource damages assessment can be used to assess these benefits, and to determine the 
value of lost resources that are not remediated.  
Damaged natural resources have multiple dimensions. The identified wildlife that were 
harmed include “8,183 birds, 1,144 sea turtles, and 109 marine mammals affected by the spill—
alive or dead, visibly oiled or not.”
111
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 There is also potential harm to fish due to oiling of 
111 BP COMM’N REPORT, supra note 1, at 181. 46 
seaweed, which imposes risks on mahi mahi, billfish, and cobia.
112 Other fish potentially harmed 
include the Bluefin tuna, the Gulf sturgeon, and several species of shark.
113 Offshore birds, such 
as Royal Terns and Gulls, likewise may have been affected if their feeding grounds became 
oiled, and open water birds and nearshore and marsh birds may also have been affected.
114 Some 
oil had reached 650 miles of Gulf coastal habitats, with 130 miles being categorized as 
moderately or heavily oiled.
115 The oil also poses longer terms risks to marine habitats, wetlands, 
corals, and other habitats.
116
The debate over putting a price tag on natural resource damages that are not remediated 
achieved prominence after the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill (EVOS), which was the largest U.S. 
coastal oil spill to that time. The plaintiffs in the EVOS litigation prepared assessments of the 
natural resource damages loss to citizens based on surveys of the public’s valuation of 
damages.
 Any damage to beaches, marshes, and the ecology of the Gulf and 
affected marshes would also be included under the natural resource damages heading, as would 
any effects on recreational activities such as fishing and swimming.  
117 These surveys were subjected to a variety of strident critiques, many of which were 
based on studies funded by Exxon. As a result of this controversy over methodology, the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration commissioned an expert panel to develop 
guidelines for the use of surveys to value natural resource damages.
118
                                                           
112 RAY MABUS, AMERICA’S GULF COAST: A LONG TERM RECOVERY PLAN AFTER THE DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL 
SPILL 28-29 (2010), http://www.restorethegulf.gov/sites/default/files/documents/pdf/gulf-recovery-sep-2010.pdf 
(last visited May 16, 2011).  
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There are three natural resource damages components pertaining to the environmental 
loss that the citizenry has experienced. The first damages category pertains to the cost that must 
be incurred by the party responsible for the oil spill. Restoration efforts may involve cleaning up 
beaches and other efforts to restore the environment to the pre-spill condition. Many of these 
costs will be incurred directly by the company responsible for the spill, as in the case of Exxon’s 
efforts to clean up the Prince William Sound area after EVOS.
119 Estimates of the restoration 
costs associated with the BP oil spill are in the range of $15 billion-$20 billion.
120
Economists’ studies of natural resource damages assessments have focused on the second 
natural resources damages component, which pertains to the losses that occur from the time of 
the oil spill until the natural resources have been fully restored. Natural resource damages can be 
ameliorated by a variety of different types of actions.
 The third 
component of damages consists of the cost of damages assessment, which one would expect to 
be a comparatively minor cost component relative to other damages associated with oil spills of 
the magnitude of BP spill.  
121
Should the environment be less than fully restored or if there is a temporary natural 
resource damages loss before full restoration, then there is a natural resource damages 
component meriting compensation. We propose that such compensation be paid to the 
government for two reasons. First, as indicated above in the discussion of optimal insurance, 
environmental losses are not the kinds of harms for which people would purchase insurance and 
 Beyond natural recovery, there could be 
removal of oil at the sites, restoration of natural resources, and either off-site replacement of the 
resource or provision of equivalent natural resources that substitute for the loss. 
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(last visited May 16, 2011). 
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for which monetary payments can substitute. Second, the nation owns the resources on the outer 
continental shelf so that payment to the government corresponds to compensating the resource 
owner.
122
Let us consider the value of damages after the level of cleanup and restoration have 
already been determined and completed. What is the value of the damages that remain? How 
should the losses be conceptualized? The reference point for determining the baseline situation 
from which all damages are assessed is analogous to the approach used in other damages 
contexts, which is to inquire what the situation would have been “but for” the wrongful conduct. 
Thus, the analysis starts by computing the trajectory over time of the value the natural resources 
would have had absent the spill. It then computes the drop in the value of the natural resource 
from the time of the spill until full restoration of the loss occurs, which may never happen. The 
loss at any point of time is the decrease in the value of the natural resources, and the total loss 
consists of the total value of these per-period losses from the time of the spill forward. Such 
assessments may be complicated by unrelated ongoing environmental deterioration as, for 
example, Louisiana has lost 2,000 square miles of wetlands since the 1930s.
  
123
As is standard in economics damages contexts, once losses that occur at different points 
in time have been determined, the value of those losses must be discounted to, or brought back to 
present value using a reasonable rate of interest.
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 Because of the role of discounting, even 
123 MABUS, supra note 112, at 26-27.  
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losses that may never be fully restored will nevertheless have a finite value provided that the 
losses are not increasing over time at a rate that exceeds the rate of discount.
125
Conceptualizing the damages in terms of trajectories highlights the dynamic nature of the 
damages assessment. What is at issue is not simply the initial loss in natural resources, though 
the initial harm will of course affect the baseline loss values. However, it is also essential to take 
into account how fast the natural resources will recover and to what extent. Thus, the valuation 
process must by necessity take into account and reductions in loss over time. If, for example, 
there are deaths to a bird population, these losses are real even if ultimately the population will 
recover fully. However, the speed of recovery and the ultimate well-being of the bird population 
are also consequential, adding an additional dimension to the nature of the environmental 
damage being assessed. Sometimes, of course, losses compound over time, and equivalent 
procedures looking at future consequences are required. 
 
The different benefit components can be categorized in terms of the services associated 
with them, where the breakdowns may involve a mix of components, some that have market 
price analogs and others that do not.
126
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be greater than 1. Should such a pattern continue with losses growing indefinitely faster than the rate of interest, 
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 Commercial/productive services pertain to largely 
financial components associated with natural resource damages such as effects on agricultural 
irrigation, municipal drinking water, and commercial fishing. In most instances, such losses will 
have either a market price or information on the impact on corporate profitability. Consequently, 
they can be linked directly to some kind of market-based effect. Such market-related benefit 
components are not the focus of our analysis as they should be relatively less problematic than 
calculating losses for which no market guidance is available. 
126 For detailed discussion of the OPA process for resource compensation, see Jones, supra note 121, at 96. 50 
Other services categories often involve non-market effects that make benefit assessment 
more difficult. Recreational and aesthetic damages pertain to the use of beaches, swimming, 
fishing, as well as activities such as bird watching. Ecological consequences include nutrient 
cycling and the well-being of fish apart from their commercial or recreational value. There may 
also be cultural or historical uses of resources. Finally, there is a category known as passive use, 
which is sometimes referred to as non-use. Even if people do not directly use the resource, they 
may nevertheless value it, perhaps because of a concern with scarce species or maintaining the 
natural resource for future generations. Closely related to passive use is the concept of option 
values: people may not currently use the resource or have any concrete plans to do so, but 
nevertheless they may value retaining the resource to keep open the possibility of using the 
resource at some future date.
127
The natural resources damages value that is lost to the citizenry is the monetary 
compensation needed to restore their welfare to what it would have been in the absence of the 
spill.
 
128
In economic terms, the value of required compensation can be viewed as a willingness to 
accept (WTA) amount. Thus, how much money is required to compensate an individual for the 
value of a loss if the objective is to restore that person’s welfare to what it would have been in 
the absence of the harm? A closely related concept is willingness to pay (WTP), the amount a 
person would be willing to pay to prevent the harm from occurring. The legal framing of 
 This principle is in line with the “make whole” approach to compensation for injury. The 
practical problem is establishing what this value should be. 
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compensation is in terms of the WTA amount. For minor effects on one’s welfare, the WTP 
amount should equal the WTA amount.
129
Notwithstanding their theoretical similarity and approximate equivalence, there are 
important gaps observed in practice between the values for WTA and WTP. In particular, WTA 
values often dwarf the values for WTP by much more than could be reasonably expected based 
on economic theory.
 
130 Based on a review of the literature including both survey and 
experimental studies, the average discrepancy between the mean WTA value across studies and 
the mean WTP value is a ratio of 7.17.
131 However, the gap is much greater for public or non-
market goods such as those involving environmental damages, as the mean ratio of WTA to 
WTP is 10.41 for such goods.
132 Unfamiliar goods that are not ordinary private goods that the 
person might purchase tend to generate high ratios.
133
This enormous discrepancy, though at odds with conventional economic theory, is 
consistent with a phenomenon well known in the behavioral decision literature as the endowment 
effect.
 Thus, even though WTA and WTP should 
be similar, they often differ by an order of magnitude for the types of commodities involved in 
natural resource damages cases. 
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reference points in affecting decisions.
135
 
 Framing choices in terms of a loss from one’s status 
quo position generates quite different and often implausibly large valuations when compared to 
valuing improvements from the current starting point. 
Conclusion 
  The BP oil spill highlighted fundamental safety problems with deepwater drilling that led 
to a catastrophic accident.
 136
The task is critical. To be sure, in response to the spill, one would expect companies to 
become more diligent and government regulators to more vigilant. However, with 3,754 
deepwater wells already drilled and more pending, there will be a substantial number of 
additional opportunities for environmental disasters.
 Alas, this accident should not be thought of as an aberrant 
occurrence, but rather an outcome that must be expected on occasion given the incentives 
operating with the current regulatory and liability regime. Examining those incentives, and 
creating a superior regime for the future, was the principal goal of this paper. 
137 Although the BP spill was the largest 
U.S. spill in offshore waters, from 1996 to 2009, there were 79 other reported loss of well control 
accidents involving uncontrolled hydrocarbon flows.
138
In our view, the policy changes undertaken to date are far from sufficient. The BP spill 
sends a clear message that our current liability structure is woefully inadequate. Had the spill not 
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involved a major international oil company with exceptionally deep pockets and had the 
environmental harm not been much less than could have occurred, the BP oil spill catastrophe 
would have been much more devastating.  
Our package of policy reforms summarized in Table 1 imposes strict liability on the oil 
drilling company in addition to requiring proof of substantial financial resources to address 
potential harms. Under our scheme, operators must be of a sufficient scale, or otherwise purchase 
insurance or post bonds, to ensure that they could cover losses in almost all situations in which 
there is a spill. We pointed out, however, that losses from a spill have a fat-tailed distribution, 
and that even with our reform proposal there is a small chance of a spill imposing costs well 
beyond such amounts. If the expected costs associated with such “excess losses” were minor 
relative to overall expected costs, this would not be a concern. However, given the fat-tailed 
nature of losses, they may in fact comprise a significant portion. In other words, the very small 
percentage of extremely large spills may account for a meaningful proportion of overall expected 
costs. For example, the BP spill surely accounts for the majority of losses from deepwater 
drilling in the United States over the course of the nation’s history. 
The inefficiencies associated with excess spills, those above the firm’s ability to pay for 
the damage are twofold. First, losses that should be compensated will not be compensated. 
Second, incentives for safety will be insufficient, because operators will recognize that they are 
not responsible for a significant portion of the expected costs they are imposing. Although not 
perfect, a second-best solution is to augment the substantial financial requirements with charges 
for the expected externality costs that cannot be covered with the company’s resources. 
  Our package of policy reforms will rectify the major shortcomings of current 
arrangements by ensuring that firms undertaking activities with catastrophic risks can pay for the 54 
damage should there be an accident, and will in fact be responsible for the full economic value of 
the costs their activities generate. This structure in turn will create incentives for companies to 
achieve an efficient level of safety. We rely on the role of a more meaningful retrospective 
liability approach rather than regulation alone, given the informational asymmetries and the 
specialized expertise that is required to effectively monitor the safety of deepwater drilling.  
Although our proposal has been inspired by the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill, it can be 
applied generally to catastrophic environmental risks. The basic ingredients that led to our 
proposal for deepwater drilling are shared by other contexts. The environmental risks being 
incurred may generate losses far in excess of the responsible party’s ability to pay. Fat-tailed 
risks of catastrophic losses demand a quite different liability structure from the one that is 
appropriate for frequently occurring, modest loss events, such as product manufacturing defects. 
One possibility would be to bolster the role of regulation, but the combination of informational 
asymmetries and lack of specialized technical expertise within government make this an 
ineffective remedy. Our two-tier liability proposal specifically recognizes the nature of 
catastrophic risks and will greatly bolsters the incentives for safety. 55 
Figure 1 
Fat tails for Catastrophic Events 
 
 
 
 
Source: U.S. Geological Service Fact Sheet, “Natural Disasters – Forecasting Economic and Life 
Losses,” http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/natural-disasters/index.html. 
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Table 1 
Comparison of Proposal to Current Liability Regime 
 
  Viscusi-Zeckhauser Proposal 
1.  Responsible party. 
Current Policy 
Single responsible party.  Joint and several liability. 
2.  Strict liability.  Yes  Yes 
3.  Tax on noncompensable 
risk. 
Yes as part of tiered liability 
system. 
No tax based on financial 
capacity but contributions to 
Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund. 
4.  Financial capacity.  Resources or insurance for BP 
spill magnitude. 
$35 million - $150 million. 
5.  Damages.  No damages cap, no punitive 
damages, compensate only 
direct losses. 
$75 million damages cap with 
exceptions, punitive damages 
possible, only direct losses 
compensable. 
6.  Natural resource 
damages. 
Priority for restoration coupled 
with benefit-cost test. 
Priority for restoration. 
7.  Recipient of net resource 
value losses. 
Government.  Government. 
8.  Regulation.  Complement, recognizing 
limitation. 
Prominent relative role. 
9.  Benefits.  Focused, net benefits, including 
environmental harms. 
Credits for energy 
independence and 
employment effects. 
10. Moratorium.  Yes  No 
 